Why is so Little Spent on Educating the Poor? by Addison, Tony & Rahman, Aminur
Copyright  UNU/WIDER 2001
1UNU/WIDER, Katajanokanlaituri 6B, Helsinki, FIN-00160, addison@wider.unu.edu
2Department of Economics, University College London, Gower Street, London WC1 6BT, United
Kingdom, uctpmra@ucl.ac.uk
This study has been prepared within the UNU/WIDER project on New Fiscal Policies for Growth and
Poverty Reduction which is directed by Tony Addison.
UNU/WIDER gratefully acknowledges the financial contribution to the project by the Government of
Italy (Directorate General for Development Cooperation).
Discussion Paper No. 2001/29
Why is so Little Spent on
Educating the Poor?
Tony Addison1 and Aminur Rahman2
July 2001
Abstract
If the poor are to benefit from economic growth, then they need the skills that are in
growing demand, and the capacity to raise their productivity as smallholder farmers and
micro-entrepreneurs. Yet, the poor seldom receive a satisfactory education. Too little is
spent on primary education—the category of education of most direct benefit to the
poor—while on average public subsidies to secondary education are roughly three times
as high as subsidies to primary education, and subsidies to tertiary education are thirty
times as high. In consequence, the higher income deciles benefit disproportionately
from public spending on education—the share of the richest income quintile (28%) is
roughly double that of poorest income quintile (13%) across countries. …/…
Keywords: poverty, income distribution, education, development
JEL classification: H52, O15, D30Why do such inequalities in public spending prevail? We argue that their wealth enables
the affluent to buy favourable policies from politicians. In contrast, the poor lack the
resources for lobbying and they face more severe collective action problems. We find
strong empirical evidence for this interest group model of politics (as opposed to the
median voter model which predicts a more redistributive pattern of public spending).
We find that income inequality—which is a proxy for the political bargaining power of
the rich versus the poor—is significant in explaining cross-country variance in the ratio
of public spending on primary education to tertiary education. Holding everything else
constant, a one standard deviation increase in the Gini coefficient would reduce the ratio
of primary-school spending to tertiary spending by 0.20 percentage point. We also find
that conflict is significant in skewing public spending away from primary education,
and that increased ethnic diversity tends to reduce the relative share of public spending
on primary schooling (although this effect may be mitigated if the political system is
democratic rather than authoritarian).
Our results raise some troubling issues for policy makers and aid donors. In particular,
more attention must be given to reducing income inequality in order to reduce political
constraints on pro-poor public expenditure reform (and on the effective implementation
of the current wave of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers). And reducing the prevalence
of conflict would facilitate resource shifts from military spending to primary schooling,
thereby lessening the need to introduce higher levels of cost recovery in the secondary
and tertiary education sectors to facilitate higher investment in primary education.
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Introduction
If the poor are to benefit from economic growth, then they need the skills that are in
growing demand, and the capacity to raise their productivity as smallholder farmers and
micro-entrepreneurs. Educating poor people spreads the benefits of growth, aside from
raising human development directly. And investment in the human capital of the poor
raises growth itself.
Yet, the poor seldom receive a satisfactory education. Too few poor children enter
primary school, too many fail to complete their education, and the quality of their
schooling is often dismal. Girls, especially rural girls, are especially disadvantaged.
Their enrolment rates are lower, and their dropout rates are higher than those of boys.
An estimated 855 million adults—nearly one sixth of humanity—are functionally
illiterate, and 64 per cent of illiterates are women (UNICEF 1999: 7, World Bank
2001a).
In aggregate, developing countries underinvest in primary education despite its benefits
for the poor, and its public good characteristics. Government spending in primary
education is too low, both absolutely and as a share of total public spending (and
relative to military spending). Parents are often the main source of primary school
funding, not the state.1 In contrast, public subsidies to secondary and tertiary education
are generally much higher than to primary education—roughly three times as high for
secondary education and thirty times as high for tertiary education (Table 1). In
consequence, the higher income deciles benefit disproportionately from public spending
on education—the share of the richest income quintile (28%) is roughly double that of
the poorest income quintile (13%) across countries (Table 2). Given this level and
pattern of public spending, and given that the poor face a highly imperfect credit
market—in which to borrow against expected higher future earnings to finance their
investments in education—an important channel for getting out of poverty is denied to
millions of people.
In highlighting this inequality in spending, we do not imply that the solution to low
primary school spending is necessarily to transfer money from secondary and tertiary
education into the primary level (see UNICEF 1999 on policy issues). Education
spending must be considered as part of total public spending (and in relation to the
possibility of raising more public revenue). There may well be large ‘unproductive’
lines of spending that can be redistributed to better uses. Indeed, halving military
spending could double or triple total public spending on education (and health) in many
countries (Table 3).2
Why do such inequalities in public spending prevail? We argue that the underlying
cause of unequal public spending is the patron-client relationship—between the affluent
1 In Uganda for instance primary education is still largely funded largely by parents who contribute
between 60 and 70 per cent of total spending on schools (Ablo and Reinikka 1998). The Ugandan
government is now attempting to redress this problem.
2 And many have pointed to the scale of debt-service relative to social sector spending in SSA and
elsewhere (Addison and Ndikumana 2000, Watkins 2001).2
elite and the government—that prevails in many countries. Economic power and the
wealth associated with it enable the affluent to buy favourable policies from politicians.
In contrast, the poor lack the resources with which to lobby and they are less organized
(the rural poor, given their number and limited resources, face a particularly severe
collective action problem). They are, therefore, in many cases unable to influence the
government in their favour. Our arguments and results are consistent with the political
economy model of interest groups and policy makers as sketched in Pineda and
Rodriguez (2000) based on Bernheim and Whinston (1986) and Dixit, Grossman and
Helpman (1997). Our results stand in contrast to the predictions of the so-called median
voter theorem, which suggests that the poorer the country, the stronger will be the
median voter, leading to a more redistributive pattern of public spending at lower per
capita income levels. We attribute the divergence between our results and the median
voter theorem to the incompleteness of the democratic contract, and the nature of
authoritarian rule, in many developing countries, particularly at the lowest per capita
income levels.
Section 1 of this paper presents a summary of the available evidence on the
distributional impact of public spending in education together with an analytical
framework to understand the determinants of the structure of education spending.
Preliminary empirical findings are set out in Section 2, which also indicates areas for
further investigation. Section 3 concludes by emphasizing the importance of reducing
high income-inequality to strengthening the political support for poverty reduction
through pro-poor public spending and other means.
1 Analytical framework
We use the ratio of public spending (as a % of per capita GNP) per student on Primary
to Tertiary education, as a proxy for inequality of public spending in education. To
reduce the influence of short run fluctuations, we take an average of this ratio over the
period 1993-1997. Our focus is therefore on underlying structural factors that determine
patterns of spending, rather than on shorter-term, macro-economic, factors.
Available evidence suggests that allocating public money to primary education is
largely pro-poor (Li Guo, Steele, and Glewwe 1999, van de Walle and Nead 1995).
Whereas the poor gain from primary education, it is higher income groups that mainly
gain from public spending in tertiary education. The reason is straightforward.
Attainment and success in tertiary education requires the successful completion of
primary and secondary school, but many of the poor fail to complete even four years of
primary schooling (the minimum necessary for functional literacy) let alone secondary
education (Filmer 1999). In India, for example, 82 percent of children from the richest
20 percent of households complete grade 8 but only 20 percent of children from the
poorest 40 percent of households do so (Filmer and Pritchett 1999). Thus the lower the
ratio of public spending in primary education to tertiary education, the higher is the
inequality of public spending in education.
The median voter theorem suggests that the poorer the country, the poorer will be the
position of the median voter; hence the theorem predicts that public spending should be
more redistributive at lower per capita income levels. Therefore, the high inequality of
public spending in education in poor countries is directly in contrast with the prediction3
of the median voter theorem. On the other hand, this phenomenon is in line with the
political economy model of interest group politics where money plays a central role in
politics. Recent studies on governance do suggest that in many poor countries policies
are often the outcome of the perverse patron-client relationship between the rich and the
state (see for instance World Bank 2000). There is also considerable evidence that the
rich benefit disproportionately from public subsidies, reflecting their political power
(see for instance Alesina 1998).
The underlying mechanism of the interest groups model is as follows. Individuals
mobilize to form interest groups through which they can bargain with politicians over
policies and resources. An interest group's formation as well as its bargaining power
depends on the group's resources; in exchange for favourable policies, politicians
receive monetary transfers—either donations to political parties in systems with
competitive elections and/or direct bribes. Consequently, the more unequal a society's
income distribution, the lower will be the bargaining power of the poor compared to the
rich, and thus the greater will be the extent of allocations in favour of the rich.
Pineda and Rodriguez (2000) empirically find that investment in human capital is
inversely related to the capital share in total output (where the latter proxies for capital
owners who are assumed to be the wealthiest in society). They formally sketch models
of both the median voter and interest groups and show that while the median voter
model cannot explain this negative correlation, such a correlation can be accounted for
with a simple model of interest groups and political influence.
Our empirical exercise in understanding the political economy of public spending on
education can therefore be viewed as a further extension of the approach of Pineda and
Rodriguez (2000). We focus more directly on the extent of unequal public spending
using the ratio of primary spending per student to tertiary spending per student as the
dependent variable.
In order to capture the inequality in influence over the state between rich and poor, we
use a measure on income inequality (the Gini coefficient) as one of our key explanatory
variables. Moreover, to scrutinise the robustness of our hypothesis of interest group
politics further, we also investigate how the income shares of the lowest 20 percent and
lowest 40 percent relative to the income share of the top 20 percent affect public
spending in education. According to our argument, the higher the share of the top
quintile relative to bottom quintile and bottom 40 percent, the higher would be the
inequality of public spending. Because of the potential simultaneity problem between
unequal public spending and income inequality and the different quintile’s share of
income, we regress the ratio of public spending in primary to tertiary education
(averaged over the period 1993-97) on the average value of the Gini coefficient (over
the period 1980-89). Similarly, regarding quintile shares, we use the average value over
1980-89. Thus these inequality measures are predetermined with respect to public
spending on education in our model and can therefore be viewed as proxies for initial
inequality.
Another key explanatory variable in our empirical model is ethno-linguistic
fragmentation. The literature on the impact of ethnic diversity on economic performance
has grown substantially in recent years. The first generation of studies tends to find
negative development effects from higher levels of ethnic diversity. Thus Easterly and
Levine (1997), conclude that ethnic diversity encourages the adoption of growth-4
retarding policies that foster rent-seeking behaviour; these in turn make it more difficult
to form a consensus for public spending on public goods that promote growth. They
therefore argue that Africa’s high level of ethnic diversity is the key to its low growth.
The impact of ethnic diversity on the structure of spending has also been found to be
adverse. In Alesina and Spolaore (1997), a public good such as a school brings less
satisfaction to everyone in an ethnically diverse society because of different preferences
for the language of instruction, curriculum, location etc. So less of the public good is
chosen by the society, thereby lowering the level of output and growth. Using a sample
of US cities, Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1997) find that the level and variety of public
goods worsens as ethnic diversity increases. Miguel (1999) likewise finds lower primary
school funding in more ethnically diverse districts in Kenya. A burgeoning literature on
matching and income inequality (Durlauf 1996, Benabou 1996, among others) shows
how neighbourhood segregation by class can adversely affect the public provision of
education. Although this literature does not emphasis ethnicity, segregation by class has
a strong ethnic dimension (see Alesina et al. 1997). For instance, Cutler and Glaser
(1995) find that African-Americans have worse outcomes for education, income and
other social dimensions in more segregated metropolitan areas. Cutler, Elmendorf and
Zeckhauser (1993) find that people have discriminatory preferences where they only
care about the welfare of others within their ethnic community. Hence, even though
comparatively disadvantaged minorities and/or groups in an ethnically fragmented and
polarized economy demand favourable public policies to enable them to escape
deprivation and destitution, such public policies may not be realized because of the
absence of adequate consensus and thus the required tax base to finance such policies.3
Luttmer (1997) shows empirically that individuals increase their support for welfare
spending if a larger fraction of welfare recipients in their area belongs to their racial
group. Thus there is some evidence that public spending in education will be unequal,
favouring the more politically and economically powerful ethnic group in an ethnically
diversified economy.4
More recent (second-generation) research, however, finds that the relationship between
ethnic diversity and development outcomes is more nuanced, at least for growth, and
strongly depends on the characteristics of the country's political system. Thus Collier
(2001) concludes that: “ethnic diversity has no adverse effects on growth in fully
democratic societies, but reduces growth by up to three percentage points in
dictatorships”. In highly diverse societies, in which no one ethnic group is dominant, it
may be more difficult for lobbies to form than in less diverse societies—where interest
groups with regard to the allocation of public spending may form around dominant
ethnic groups.
We therefore use ethno linguistic fragmentation as a regressor in order to investigate
whether, in more ethnically diverse societies, concentration of political and economic
power into the hands of one or a few ethnic groups results in a more unequal structure
3 Rubinfeld (1987) among others find that that African-Americans are more supportive of spending on
public education than others.
4 Goldwin and Katz (1998) find that more ethnic and religious homogeneity fostered high school
expansion from 1910 to 1930.5
of public spending on education. Ethno linguistic fractionalization (ELF) measures the
probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will not belong to
the same ethno linguistic group (Atlas Narodov Mira 1964) and this variable has been
widely used in the literature to proxy for ethnic fragmentation (for instance, Easterly
and Levine 1997, Mauro 1995 among others). In order to capture a much broader
dimension of ethnic diversity, we use a measure of ethnic fragmentation, that is an
average of the probability that two randomly selected people from a given country
(i) will not belong to the same ethno linguistic group, (ii) will not speak the same
language (Muller 1964, Roberts 1962), (iii) the percentage of the population not
speaking the official language (Gunnemark 1991) and (iv) the percentage of the
population not speaking the most widely used language (ibid.). This index (termed
AVELF) is also used in Easterly and Levine (1997) and is taken from there. As a
robustness check, we run the regressions using this broad index of ethnic diversity as
well as using ethnic fragmentation. The results are very similar and thus we only report
the regression results that use AVELF as a regressor.
We also include an Africa dummy variable, since Africa has high levels of ethnic
fragmentation. But in addition, many African countries have gone through a transition
to multi-party politics over the last decade. By 1999, 45 countries had multi-party
constitutions compared with only 8 in 1988 (Thomson 2000: 216). The inclusion of the
African dummy may therefore partly control for the effect of democratization in
dampening the effects of ethnic diversity in some African countries (i.e. the thesis
advanced by Collier 2001).
Our third key issue for investigation is the impact of conflict on the structure of public
spending in education. The role of conflict in determining expenditure outcomes (and
fiscal policy more generally) has been a neglected issue, despite the prevalence of
conflict in developing countries, particularly in Africa—29 African countries have
recently gone through major conflict (Addison and Murshed 2000). There are several
channels through which conflict can influence public education spending. Conflict
reduces the tax base, thereby reducing the revenues for expenditures, and military
expenditures rise at the expense of the social sectors. With the contraction in total
resources, and the rise in private discount rates (due to increased uncertainty), interest
groups will intensify their lobbying for shares in this reduced pie and the poor are likely
to loose out further in the resulting wartime bargaining process (in Angola, for example,
basic social spending has collapsed over the last decade). Conflict also has direct effects
on education due to the destruction of physical capital, infrastructure (including school
buildings), and human capital. This destruction is often greatest in rural areas, where
most of the poor live in low-income countries (Mozambique is an example), and thus
primary education expenditures are likely to contract proportionately more than
spending on secondary and tertiary education which is tilted towards urban areas.
The fall in the share of primary education may not necessarily be reversed post-war
since the rich may successfully lobby (or hold state power, as in Liberia) to skew
reconstruction spending towards themselves. Moreover, war can significantly raise
income inequality—often the poor are hit disproportionately hard, while the rich and the
'new rich' may reap wartime rents from preferential access to rationing etc.—thereby
increasing their resources available for lobbying, to the detriment of pro-poor spending.
Post-war growth may therefore be narrower in the distribution of its benefits than pre-
war growth (Addison and Murshed 2000).6
We try to proxy for the impact of conflict by using three different measures: the
proportion of minorities belonging to minorities at risk in 1990, PROP90 (from Gurr
1993); an index of racial tensions in 1984, RACIALT (from Knack and Keefer 1995);5
and an index of the intensity of conflict over the period 1989-1997 (from the Uppsala
Conflict Data Project).6
Finally, natural-resource rich countries are often characterised by extreme inequality in
the distribution of the resource rents, which are frequently captured by rich elites
particularly in mineral exporters (Botswana is one of the few exceptions). This
phenomenon usually goes together with severe urban-bias in public spending—which in
itself tends to be detrimental to expenditure on rural primary education. Countries that
are rich in natural resources (particularly mineral resources) also have a high propensity
to conflict, particularly in SSA (Murshed and Perälä 2000). We therefore include a
dummy variable for whether a country is a major exporter of non-fuel primary
commodities or not.7
The generic form of our empirical model can thus be represented as follows:
(1) Inequality of public education spending = f (X, economic inequality, ethnic
fragmentation, conflict, Africa dummy, natural resource dummy)
where, X is a vector of standard controls such as the initial level of per capita GDP (in
our model, 1990), RGDPPC90 and population density in 1997, POPDEN.8 Several
variants of this model are estimated and the results are discussed in the following.
5 The value of the index is ranged between 1(low tension) and 6 (high tension).
6 Uppsala Conflict Data Project: States in Armed Conflict, Uppsala University, Sweden Wallensteen
and Sollenberg (2000). The scale of intensity is as follows: 0-no conflict, 1-minor armed conflict, 2-
intermediate armed conflict, and 3-war.
7 This takes a value of 1 for a major exporter of a non-fuel commodities, and O otherwise.
8 We also try the share of different age groups such as the share of the population aged between 0 and
14 and the share of population aged between 15 and 64 as controls. These variables turn out to be
insignificant in explaining the inequality in public spending on education, and they worsen the overall
fit of the model. We therefore exclude these controls from our final estimations.7
2 Empirical findings
The key empirical findings of our political economy model of public spending in
education are summarized in Table 4. The adverse effect of initial income inequality on
the share of primary education in education spending—which supports our interest
group hypothesis—and the adverse effect of ethnic fragmentation as discussed above
are prominent in model 1. Both of these effects are highly statistically significant.
Quantitatively, holding other things constant, one standard deviation increase in the
Gini coefficient would decrease the ratio of primary spending to tertiary spending by
0.20 points. Similarly, one standard deviation increase in ethnic diversity would
increase the inequality of public spending by 0.18 points. While both of the standard
controls (real per capita GDP, 1990 and population density, 1997) are marginally
significant at the 10% level (more specifically, at the 11% level), their respective
coefficients imply that they do not have any economic significance on the public
spending variable.
In models 2 and 3, we introduce two separate measures to proxy for conflict, PROP90
and RACIALT. Neither has a (statistically) significant effect on the distribution of
public spending and, moreover, inclusion of each of these conflict measures reduces
both the economic and statistical significance of AVELF. But the coefficient on income
inequality remains highly significant.
Each of these conflict measures has an ethnic dimension and in fact, in our sample we
find a reasonable degree of correlation between each of these variables and AVELF.
The partial correlation coefficient between AVELF and PROP90 is 0.47, implying that
the higher the ethnic fragmentation, the higher would be the proportion of population
belonging to minorities at risk. Interestingly, the rather high and negative (-0.73) partial
correlation coefficient between AVELF and RACIALT may imply that the higher is
ethnic diversity, the lower will be racial tension—perhaps because higher ethnic
diversity raises the willingness to co-habit among different ethnic/racial groups in the
manner suggested by Collier (2001).
Because of this correlation between conflict measures and ethnic diversity and
particularly given our small sample size, we further try to investigate the impact of
conflicts in the absence of controlling for AVELF in order to asses the sensitivity of the
effect of conflicts and ethnic diversity. Now in model 4, we find a highly statistically
significant adverse impact of conflict, proxied by PROP90 on the distribution of public
spending. Quantitatively, one standard deviation increase in PROP90 would increase the
inequality of public spending in education by 0.20 points. However, RACIALT is still
insignificant in model 5.
Since each of these conflict measures has an ethnic dimension, we further investigate
the combined effect of ethnic diversity and conflict on public spending in education by
interacting AVELF and PROP90, AVELPRO in model 6 and AVELF and RACIALT
(AVELRAC) in model 7. Now each of these combined measure of ethnic diversity and
conflict seems to have a significant impact on inequality in public spending in
education. Quantitatively, in model 6, one standard deviation increase in AVELPRO
would increase the inequality in public spending by 0.20 points and in model 7, one8
standard deviation increase in AVELRAC would increase the inequality in education
spending by 0.22 points.9
The empirical findings provide strong support for an interest group theory of politics,
with the unequal lobbying power of the rich and the poor resulting in a distribution of
public spending in education that is titled towards the former. We also find some
support for the potentially adverse impact of ethno linguistic fragmentation, conflict,
and the interaction of ethnic fragmentation and conflict, on the inequality of public
spending in education.
To examine the robustness of our interest group hypothesis in further detail, we run a
similar set of regressions, this time replacing the Gini coefficient by (i) the ratio of the
income share of the lowest 20% to the highest 20% and (ii) the ratio of the income share
of the lowest 40% to the highest 20% (Table 4). According to our hypothesis, the higher
the initial income share of the poorest group(s) relative to the richest group, the greater
will be their bargaining power over public spending. Public spending in primary
education relative to tertiary spending will therefore increase (decrease) with the
increase (decrease) of the income share of the bottom quintile or bottom 40% relative to
the top 20% (models 8 to 14 in Table 4). As can be seen from Table 4, our prediction
seems to be strongly supported by the empirical results.
Introducing an African dummy reduces the strength of the ethnolinguistic fragmentation
variables but not their (negative) sign (Table 5). This may be because Africa is one of
the most ethnically fragmented regions, the Africa dummy is capturing fragmentation
per se, or because the democratic transition in some African countries over the last
decade has diluted (but not reversed) the otherwise negative impact of ethnolinguistic
fragmentation (thus supporting Collier 2001). We intend to investigate this issue further.
Introducing a dummy for the share of non-fuel primary commodity exports also has an
adverse effect on inequality in public spending on education (Table 6).10 This may
indicate that the rents from mineral exports are narrowly allocated towards the elite in
many countries (Zambia, for example, failed to use its copper wealth to adequately
invest in basic social services). We intend to investigate this issue in more detail.
Figures 1 to 4 graph the relationships between measures of inequality in public spending
on education, and measures of income inequality and ethnolinguistic fractionalization.
9 We also undertook a similar exercise using the intensity of conflict (as mentioned above). While the
results are similar, using intensity of conflict drastically reduces our sample size to 13-14. We thus
exclude this indicator as a proxy for conflict.
10 The data on primary commodity exporters are from the World Bank's Global Development Network
Database (http://www.worldbank.org/research/growth/).9
3 Conclusions and policy implications
This paper has investigated why the distribution of public spending in education is often
skewed away from primary education—the level of education of most benefit to the
poor—despite the high private and social returns to investing in good quality primary
schooling. We find that a high level of initial income-inequality is a determinant of such
skewed public spending (thereby perpetuating, and even increasing, income inequality
as well as poverty, over time) confirming the plausibility of the interest-group model as
an explanation of spending outcomes. We also find that conflict is significant in
skewing public spending away from primary expenditure and towards education
expenditures of most value to the non-poor. In our results, ethnolinguistic fragmentation
tends to reduce the relative share of primary spending (thus supporting the conclusions
of the first-generation studies on this issue). But this issue needs further investigation by
introducing democratization variables to capture the effect of democratization in
reducing and reversing the negative effects of ethnic diversity (as argued by Collier
2001).
Our results raise some troubling issues for policy makers. First, efforts to shift public
spending towards primary education in order to raise the participation of the poor in
growth are likely to meet fierce resistance from the affluent in societies with high
income inequality. The experiences of Brazil, Guatemala, and South Africa seem to
bear this out. Relatedly, donor inspired Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs)—
which supposedly commit governments to pro-poor actions, including pro-poor
education policy—may not be translated into increased pro-poor spending once
lobbying by the affluent kicks in. Indeed, parallel action to reduce income inequality—
and thus the resources available to the affluent to block reform—may be necessary to
the achievement of successful pro-poor expenditure reform. Hence, well-designed land
reform together with the closure of pro-rich exemptions in the tax system (to name but
two redistributive instruments) may therefore be necessary to ease political constraints
on raising pro-poor public spending. This cuts against the present donor consensus that
income inequality can be largely ignored in the creation of strategies for poverty
reduction.
Second, efforts to raise pro-poor spending are constrained (and often reversed) by the
prevalence of conflict, especially in SSA. Conflict prevention, together with credible
peace agreements, therefore have potentially high returns to poverty reduction.
Moreover, reducing the prevalence of conflict would facilitate resource shifts from
military spending to primary schooling, thereby lessening the need to introduce higher
levels of cost recovery in the secondary and tertiary education levels to fund higher
investment in primary education.
Finally, if governments and donors wish to see the achievement of broad-based (poverty
reducing) growth then they must recognize that raising pro-poor spending—so that the
poor have the skills to contribute and benefit from that growth—is not simply a
technocratic or managerial process, but one that is also deeply political in nature.
Specifically, successful democratic transition can, in giving voice to the poor, increase
their ability to shift spending towards themselves (i.e. median voter effects start to
counteract lobbying by the affluent) and reduce (and reverse) the potentially harmful
effects of ethnic diversity in authoritarian and dictatorial political systems. Hence,
democratic transition is likely to be a necessary (although not sufficient) condition for
achieving pro-poor growth in many countries.10
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Côte d'Ivoire, 1995 CFAF 64,840 117,462 1.8 348,453 5.4
Ghana, 1992 Cedis 24,824 65,275 2.6 392,707 15.8
Guinea, 1994 GNF 47,625 116,812 2.5 2,595,705 54.5
Kenya, 1992/93 K Shs. 1,368 3,868 2.8 42,050 30.7
Madagascar, 1994 FMG 50,504 192,491 3.8 1,140,000 22.6
Malawi, 1994/95 Kwachas 220 909 4.1 15,523 70.6
South Africa, 1994 DBSA 1,124 2,055 1.8 5,657 5.0
Tanzania, 1993/94 T Shs. 6,600 7,500 1.1 – –
Uganda, 1992/93 U Shs. 11,667 37,352 3.2 373,525 32.0
– Not available.
Source: The Table is reproduced from Castro-Leal, Dayton, and Demery (1999: 63)
Table 2
Public spending on education by income quintile in selected developing countries, various years (per cent)
Quintile
12345
Country Year (poorest) (richest)
Armenia 1996 7 17 22 25 29
Côte d'Ivoire 1995 14 17 17 17 35
Ecuador 1998 11 16 21 27 26
Ghana 1992 16 21 21 21 21
Guineaa 1994 9 13 21 30 27
Jamaica 1992 18 19 20 21 22
Kazakhstan 1996 8 16 23 27 26
Kenya 1992/93 17 20 21 22 21
Kyrgyz Republic 1993 14 17 18 24 27
Madagascar 1993/94 8 15 14 21 41
Malawi 1994/95 16 19 20 20 25
Morocco 1998/99 12 17 23 24 24
Nepal 1996 11 12 14 18 46
Nicaragua 1993 9 12 16 24 40
Pakistan 1991 14 17 19 21 29
Panama 1997 20 19 20 24 18
Peru 1994 15 19 22 23 22
Romania 1994 24 22 21 19 15
South Africa 1993 21 19 17 20 23
Tanzania 1993 13 16 16 16 38
Vietnam 1993 12 16 17 19 35
Source: The Table is reproduced from World Bank (2001b: 80).
Note: a Includes only primary and secondary educationTable 3
. Public expenditure on health, education, and the military as percentages of GNP in Sub-Saharan Africa







Angola 3.9 --- 20.5
Benin 1.6 3.2 1.5
Botswana 2.7 8.6 5.1
Burkina Faso 1.2 1.5 2.8
Burundi 0.6 4.0 6.1
Cameroon 1.0 -- 3.0
Central African Republic 1.9 -- 3.9
Chad 2.4 1.7 2.7
Congo, Democratic Rep. 1.2 -- 5.0
Congo, Rep. 1.8 6.1 4.1
Cote d'Ivoire 1.4 5.0 1.1
Eritrea 2.9 1.8 7.8
Ethiopia 1.7 4.0 1.9
Ghana 1.8 4.2 0.7
Guinea 1.2 1.9 1.5
Kenya 2.2 6.5 2.1
Lesotho 3.7 8.4 2.5
Madagascar 1.1 1.9 1.5
Malawi 2.8 5.4 1
Mali 2 2.2 1.7
Mauritania 1.8 5.1 2.3
Mozambique 2.1 -- 2.8
Namibia 3.8 9.1 2.7
Niger 1.3 2.3 1.1
Nigeria 0.2 0.7 1.4
Rwanda 2.1 -- 4.4
Senegal 2.6 3.7 1.6
Sierra Leone 1.7 -- 5.9
South Africa 3.2 7.9 1.8
Tanzania 1.3 -- 1.3
Togo 1.1 4.5 2.0
Uganda 1.8 2.6 4.2
Zambia 2.3 2.2 1.1
Zimbabwe 3.1 -- 3.8
Source: DFID (2001: 24-25)
A larger proportion of military spending is 'off budget' compared with education and health spending in many
countries. Accordingly, the reported data on military spending should be treated as lower bounds.Table 4
Dependent variable- Public spending per student (as a % of GNP) in primary education/Public spending per student (as a % of GNP) in tertiary education*

















































































































# of observations 41 26 38 26 38 26 38 36 36 23 23 33 33
Adj. R
2 0.26 0.52 0.19 0.51 0.20 0.50 0.25 0.21 0.21 0.45 0.47 0.17 0.18
Constant term is not reported. White’s Heteroskedasticity Consistent t-ratios are in parentheses
* Income Inequality Measures are from the WIDER Inequality Database (all OKIN categories), RGDPPC90 and Public Expenditure per student (as a % of GNP) at
primary, secondary and tertiary are from the World Bank World Development Indicators database levels, AVELF, PROP90 and RACIALT are from the Easterlya n d
Levine (1997).Table 5
Regression results with Africa Dummy. Dependent variable- Public spending per student (as a % of GNP) in primary/Public spending per student (as a % of GNP) in tertiary
education





































































































# of observations 41 26 38 44 36 36 23 23 33 33
Adj. R
2 0.26 0.69 0.32 0.29 0.32 0.33 0.66 0.68 0.15 0.16
Constant term is not reported. White’s Heteroskedasticity Consistent t-ratios are in parentheses.Table 6
Regression results with Dummy for Nonfuel Primary Commodities Exporters (PRIMNFX). Dependent variable-
Public spending per student (as a % of GNP) in primary/Public spending per student(as a % of GNP) in tertiary education









































































































# of observations 41 41 26 38 36 36 23 23 33 33
Adj. R
2 0.25 0.24 0.56 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.52 0.54 0.16 0.17
Constant term is not reported. White’s Heteroskedasticity Consistent t-ratios are in parentheses. Data on primary commodity exporters are from the World Bank's Global Development Network DatabaseFigure 1
Primary to tertiary spending ratio and income inequality
linear regression
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primary to tertiary public spending per student, 1993-97 = 1.51 + -0.02 * gini80s
R-Square = 0.15Figure 2
Primary to tertiary spending ratio and income share of bottom 40% to top 20%
linear regression
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primary to tertiary public spending per student, 1993-97 = 0.13 + 1.03 * topbot40
R-Square = 0.11Figure 3
Primary to tertiary spending ratio and income share of bottom 20% to top 20%
linear regression
0.10 0.20 0.30























































































primary to tertiary public spending per student, 1993-97 = 0.25 + 2.08 * topbot20
R-Square = 0.09Figure 4
Primary to tertiary spending ratio and ethnolinguistic fractionalization
linear regression

















































































































primary to tertiary public spending per student, 1993-97 = 0.69 + -0.85 * avelf
R-Square = 0.26Appendix I
Summary statistics of sample observations
Variable | Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
---------+-----------------------------------------------------
edu93971 | 75 .4932195 .563659 .0050974 2.921217
rgdppc90 | 183 1.54e+13 1.07e+14 14970 1.31e+15
popden | 183 1067.513 4112.393 1.982975 41831.48
avelf | 159 .3283762 .3017278 0 1
prop90 | 84 .272556 .2744174 .0057 1.01
racialt | 108 3.62963 1.666563 0 6
gini80s | 93 36.61401 10.10854 19.22 62.9
avelpro | 84 .1350144 .1897885 0 .826079
avelrac | 107 .8657628 .7978526 0 3.186667
topbot20 | 69 .1549487 .0754966 .0383693 .349779
topbot40 | 69 .423211 .1677662 .1350919 .8069196
ssa | 212 .2358491 .4255331 0 1
primnfx | 211 .2559242 .4374172 0 1
Appendix II
Partial correlation coefficients
| edu93971 rgdppc90 popden avelf prop90 racialt gini80s
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------
edu93971 | 1.0000
rgdppc90 | 0.3657 1.0000
popden | -0.3856 -0.0865 1.0000
avelf | -0.4904 -0.2979 0.3451 1.0000
prop90 | -0.3506 -0.1906 0.0538 0.3518 1.0000
racialt | 0.3183 0.1464 -0.4116 -0.7410 -0.5056 1.0000
gini80s | -0.5113 -0.1479 -0.1592 0.1049 0.2572 0.0968 1.0000
avelpro | -0.3922 -0.1831 0.2401 0.5716 0.8979 -0.6071 0.2140
avelrac | -0.4148 -0.3423 -0.2053 0.6429 0.1309 -0.1450 0.2165
topbot20 | 0.4663 0.1428 0.1838 -0.0922 -0.1883 -0.1982 -0.9034
topbot40 | 0.5203 0.1513 0.1348 -0.1524 -0.2118 -0.1318 -0.9381
ssa | -0.2520 -0.0753 -0.0947 0.5319 -0.2088 -0.1343 0.0134
primnfx | -0.2300 -0.1356 -0.1736 0.1379 -0.2054 0.0970 0.2299
| avelpro avelrac topbot20 topbot40 ssa primnfx
---------+------------------------------------------------------
avelpro | 1.0000
avelrac | 0.1687 1.0000
topbot20 | -0.1580 -0.2656 1.0000
topbot40 | -0.1955 -0.2836 0.9903 1.0000
ssa | -0.1014 0.6599 -0.0339 -0.0568 1.0000
primnfx | -0.1923 0.2726 -0.2013 -0.2049 0.5492 1.0000Appendix III
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